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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to 
carry out research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and 
vulnerability is exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms 
one element in a broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide 
the full documentation of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not 
confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through which such impacts occur 
and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a 
practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy 
recommendations to donor government agencies. 
 
This report on Somalia is one of 13 case studies. This research draws upon secondary 
data sources including existing research studies, reports and evaluations 
commissioned by operational agencies, and early warning and survey data where this 
has been available. These secondary sources have been complemented by interviews 
with government officers, aid policymakers and practitioners, researchers and 
members of the local population. This work was carried out in Nairobi in February 
and September 2004. The author would like to thank the many Somali, international 
NGOs, UN and donor bodies based there. The report has also benefited greatly from 
inputs from Dr June Rock. The author would also like to thank Mark Bradbury and 
Reg Green for comments on an earlier draft; however, they are not responsible for any 
shortcomings in this final version. The analysis and opinions expressed in this report 
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policy of DFID 
or the UK government. 
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Executive summary 
 
Somalia represents an extreme case. It has experienced a long period of insecurity and 
instability; its people have been subject to a wide range of armed violence. Following 
the overthrow of the military regime in 1991, it has experienced the longest period of 
statelessness of any country in modern history. A period of intense armed conflict for 
power between factions based around the clans that make up Somali society 
eventually gave way to an unresolved stalemate in the capital and the south-central 
areas. Fighting between smaller militia groups who preyed on the population has 
continued in most of these areas until the present. In the northeast and northwest a 
degree of security was slowly negotiated and these areas have enjoyed relative 
stability and the state-type administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively, 
which offer examples of control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and armed 
violence.  
 
The case thus allows for analysis of several stages and types of armed violence and of 
the context of statelessness, but also comparison of the different processes at work in 
areas of much greater or lesser armed violence and impoverishment. 
 
The Republic of Somalia that came into being in 1960 has been subject to intense 
armed violence for most of its existence (and before). It has experienced military 
coup, inter-state war, insurgencies, civil war and ‘institutionalised disorder’ and 
insecurity. Likewise, SALW, as well as heavy weapons, have been widely spread 
since colonial times and through these stages of violent conflict, supplied by cold war 
powers, neighbouring governments and an active illegal market.  
 
The contending parties in the period of crisis since any semblance of a state with a 
monopoly of means of violence disappeared in 1991 have included: 
• Factional militias, mainly clan-based 
• Business militias, forced into self-protection 
• Private security guards 
• Freelance armed groups (mooryan) 
The problem of SALW is often seen by those bidding for political power in a new 
Somalia and by international actors as their spread to ‘civilians’. In reality it is their 
possession by these armed groups that represents a threat now and to a future peace. 
Without alternative livelihoods there is no solution. However, the juxtaposition of 
critically insecure with stable regions, which were also awash with SALW, 
demonstrates that their availability alone is not a single explanatory ‘cause’ of 
impoverishment. 
 
Even without a state, Somali society and culture has a varied set of institutions and 
norms for reducing armed violence and resolving conflict. For the most part these 
were not sufficient to hold the recent violent conflicts at bay and the structures 
themselves have been further eroded and distorted in the process. Nevertheless, they 
have been an important mechanism for building security and reducing armed violence 
in the stable regions – far more successful than the 14 formal peace conferences 
sponsored by external powers. 
 
The long period of instability has spawned its own war economy characterized 
initially by seizure of public assets, then by extortion, hi-jacking, piracy, protection 
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rackets, including of NGOs and relief operations, seizure of land and property and 
trade in the local narcotic, khat. Many have enriched themselves at the expense of the 
impoverishment of the many and have a vested interest in insecurity. However, new 
enterprise in livestock trading, and simple but hi-tech telecommunications and private 
airlines have been developed by businessmen with an interest in promoting peace. 
Some analysts have pointed to economic growth in these areas of the economy but 
these has been confined to the more stable geographical areas, to those with the 
resources to make the best of it and left or forced others in impoverishment. The result 
at the macro-economic level has been to reverse the patterns of regional 
differentiation, with poorly endowed pastoral areas in the north now with higher 
income levels than formerly better-off areas, especially in the main agricultural areas 
in the South. This is a dramatic demonstration of the impact of armed violence on 
poverty. 
 
The most direct impoverishment has been experienced by the refugees in 
neighbouring countries and especially by the internally displaced, together estimated 
at 800,000. They live in unsanitary and inadequate housing with little access to clean 
water, health care or education, and most are found among the ‘very poor’ in surveys. 
The proportion of their households headed by women is even higher than among the 
ordinary population, where it has grown significantly in the period of insecurity. 
Somali culture, however, imposes strict embargoes against violence on women and 
children; although this may have limited their being targeted it has not prevented it. 
The tradition of women marrying out their clan or sub-clan, to help build bridges in 
and resolve conflict has also been eroded, although women have been active in peace-
making.  
 
The overall climate of insecurity and the political economy associated with that 
insecurity have had massive indirect impacts on incomes and livelihoods. The most 
productive agricultural areas have been hardest hit through contest over land and 
destruction of irrigation works, but pastoralism has also been limited in access to 
grazing, in some areas by increased competition for scarce resources and limited 
access to markets. One measure of these impacts is that GDP per capita has fallen 
from US$280 in 1989 to US$226 in 2002. However, regional differences again 
correlate with the levels of armed violence, with all the regions of Somaliland and 
Puntland being above the national average. Health and educational provision and 
literacy levels have similarly fallen, with a partial recovery in the last few years as a 
result of private provision, which places it beyond the means to pay of the poorest, 
and of NGO services. 
 
Somalia stands poised today at the start of a long negotiated peace process with all 
contending factions now accepting a new government-in-formation. All agree that 
disarmament is one of the greatest needs, but also potentially the most complex issue 
in the transition. Realists believe that it may be possible to get agreements between 
major factions to decommission heavy weapons such as the mounted guns called 
‘technicals’, but that dependence on SALW for livelihoods and protection and the 
widespread lack of trust will mean general SALW disarmament may have to be 
approached gradually. However, lessons on disarmament and on building community-
based security networks can be taken on board from Somaliland and Puntland 
experience. These issues are related to and will have to be planned in conjunction 
with the massive problem of providing alternative livelihoods for armed young males. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Why look at Somalia? 
 
Somalia’s experience in some respects makes it an extreme case. In a comparative 
perspective that may make it all the more revealing of tendencies latent or less intense 
elsewhere. It has experienced intense periods of violent conflict, of varied forms of 
armed violence, over a long period. It has seen the overthrow of a state and survived 
perhaps the longest period without a centralised state of any country in modern 
history. Sustained armed and political conflict has gone on around the struggle for 
state power. Armed violence has also been fuelled because of the absence of 
centralised institutions for resolving conflict and disputes, for controlling arms and for 
providing security for inhabitants. At the same time some areas of the country have 
evolved administrations that have guaranteed some security and performed these 
state-like functions. In these latter areas, some provision of social and economic 
services and collection of revenues has been possible; where statelessness has 
persisted all provision of former civic entitlements disappeared but may have been 
partially replaced by private provision.  
 
This particular experience viewed in comparative perspective allows a number of 
issues to be raised: 
1. Long-term poverty impacts. The long period of insecurity, of persistent open or 
latent armed violence, and the absence of a state for so long allow one to uncover 
some of the long-term processes affecting poverty and development although 
these in turn have to be set against even longer-term trends in a particular pattern 
of poverty that has an even longer history. 
2. ‘Positive’ economic impacts? Some analysts have cited evidence to suggest that 
certain positive impacts on development have accompanied the armed violence 
and chronic insecurity: in livestock and other trade, in new enterprises and 
adaptation of new technologies. Debate about how far these positive assessments 
are true or generalised, as opposed to assessments of long-term impoverishment, 
can be very instructive in comparative investigation about positive and negative 
impacts of armed violence, and identifying the unequal spread of those impacts. 
3. How much does SALW availability explain? All areas of the country have been 
inundated with SALW and even heavy weapons, and these have become scattered 
throughout the population. This spread has certainly fuelled the violence. But the 
co-existence in these circumstances of areas with high-levels of continued armed 
violence, even if localised, with areas of stability where it is held in check, allows 
comparison to test the significance of SALW availability as a single explanatory 
factor and the significance of other factors. 
4. Benefits of security. Areas where there has been some degree of stability offer 
the prospect of understanding the correlation between poverty and armed violence 
by assessing the extent of any ‘peace dividend’. 
5. How to approach disarmament? There are many instances of successful (in the 
stable areas) and unsuccessful (mainly in the still armed violence-prone areas) 
initiatives at arms reduction, demobilisation and broad peace-making, which could 
inform discussion about policies and programmes for tackling armed violence and 
poverty. 
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2. The context of armed violence 
2.1 The underlying conflict dynamics 
 
2.1.1 Parties to the conflict and their motivation 
 
Somalia has endured major armed conflict or more localised outbreaks of violence 
between armed groups through all but the first decade of its independence in 1960. 
Formed by the union of the colonies of Italian and British Somaliland at the moment 
of their independence, the new state also announced a grand design to unite the 
Somali people – the nearest sub-Saharan Africa had to a single nation – living in 
eastern Ethiopia, north-eastern Kenya and in Djibouti into one nation state. This was a 
key element in fuelling one of Africa’s few inter-state wars with Ethiopia in the 
1970s, which in turn brought in the Cold War super powers. Somalia’s invasion of 
Ethiopia was reversed when it found its Soviet allies changing sides and backing 
Ethiopia. In the next decade, the antagonism between the states was transformed into 
support of each other’s insurgent movements.  
 
In Somalia, the regime of Siad Barre, which had come to power by an army coup, 
proclaimed broader goals of uniting the Somali people internally and the clans to 
which they almost all belonged, and in ‘socialist’ construction. Some progress was 
made in the former endeavour, through the introduction of a script for the language 
enabling it to be used as the language of instruction in all schools. However, social 
and economic change proved elusive and despite the rhetoric against tribalism and 
clanism, the regime became ever narrower in its clan composition and in the 
patronage it provided. Eventually insurgencies emerged in several regions, one of the 
strongest in the north-west in the former British Somaliland, largely among those 
from the Issaq clan, supported until 1988 by Ethiopia. This movement, the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), using guerrilla strategies, was eventually able to defeat 
the wing of the army based there and take control of much of that territory. Other 
major movements, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in the 
north-east and the United Somali Congress (USC) in the centre, were also to 
challenge the power of the regime and between them they eventually ousted the 
government in early 1991. In a somewhat different guise these movements still tend to 
be the building blocks of the politics of armed violence of the last decade. 
 
Since then, Somalia has been marked by the failure throughout 14 years to install a 
functioning, legitimate, central government for the former Republic – this absence of 
a state is a mark of its unique and perilous position. What emerged was a proliferation 
of armed militia groups based on clans, which vied to fill the vacuum of power in the 
early 1990s. In the north-west (Somaliland) and north-east (Puntland) regions, such 
groups reached agreement and gained support of civil society to guarantee some 
security and even put in place administrations that performed state functions. Some 
pockets of stability and order emerged, often temporarily, in the rest of the country. 
However, mainly disorder and low-levels of armed violence persisted to this day even 
though major clan militia confrontation was held in check for the last several years. 
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2.1.2 Phases of armed violence 
 
As indicated above, armed violence has been a feature of the history of Somalia since 
the 1970s with successive phases marked by increasing availability of SALW and 
heavy weapons, and by different forms of violent conflict: 
 
• Militarisation of independent Somalia, 1963-76. A border conflict with 
Ethiopia from 1963 lead among other consequences to acceptance of military 
aid from the Soviet Union and a regional arms race, which has been on-going 
ever since in some form, deflecting state expenditure away from development 
and social services. The scale became massive as Somalia eventually 
developed the largest army in Africa. A military coup in 1969 put the army in 
power and it survived so long because of huge military supplies from the 
USSR, and then from US aid which continued until 1988. 
• Ethiopia-Somalia War, 1977-79. The invasion of the Ogaden region of 
Ethiopia by the Somalia army heralded one of Africa’s few inter-state wars, 
with further massive military expenditures by both states, and the backing of 
each side by super powers. The arms build-ups in the 1960s and 1970s were 
the original source of the huge arsenals that the factions could draw on in the 
1970s. 
• Insurgencies against the military regime, 1985-91. The first major 
escalation internally was in 1988 when the insurgency in the north-west by the 
SNM was cut off from its base areas in Ethiopia and opted for moving to full-
scale guerrilla war inside the country. Major fighting ensued with massive 
anti-personnel repression by the army until its overthrow. Lower-key 
insurgencies in other regions contributed to the defeat of the army, the 
overthrow of the regime and the destruction of virtually all public facilities in 
1991. 
• Civil war, 1991-93. Major clashes between the clan-based militia fighting for 
control of a successor government and of major locations such as Mogadishu, 
principally, and other ports, and of prime land, together created massive 
disorder, a major famine in parts of the South and clan cleansing. Despite 
international ‘humanitarian intervention’ and successive UN missions, and 13 
peace conferences and many agreements since 1993, neither order nor a state 
was restored. 
• Institutionalised disorder and insecurity, 1994- .The major conflicts of the 
early 1990s produced a stalemate in the confrontations between the major 
militia factions, which only occasionally erupted when control of some town 
or territory was challenged. In its place some security regimes emerged largely 
from below, which produced some disarmament and a minimal state-type 
structure in the north-west and north-east and in other smaller pockets. 
Elsewhere, the strength and the economic sustainability of the militia factions 
waned somewhat, but a plethora of armed groups emerged and interacted, 
maintaining a climate of insecurity and impunity. Persistent lower-level 
violence, mainly perpetrated by freelance militias (see 2.2.2 below), has 
continued, usually for control of resources or extortion and recently, as a 
‘peace’ seemed possible, for a place at the political table. 
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2.1.3 Patterns of violence and how violence is organised 
 
The most common forms of continued direct violence, especially by the small, 
militias active today has been listed thus (CRD, 2004): 
• Assassination 
• Kidnapping 
• Car-jacking 
• Roadblocks 
• Burglary 
• Rape 
With regard to the last, the CRD report acknowledges that sexual violence against 
women and children, “a rare occurrence in traditional Somali society”, has 
nevertheless increased, but that it is more associated with freelance groups. However, 
Musse (2004) would give greater emphasis to such trends (see 3.1.2 below). 
 
The underlying threat of violence in turn has had more indirect but equally serious 
impacts. It sustains a pattern of privatised control over land and property, everything 
from urban real estate to water points. Sometimes conflicts over these resources are 
resolved by negotiated settlements, but most remained unresolved. Claims by those 
dispossessed and the large sections of society excluded from such assets will provide 
an enormous, continuing legacy of disputes that any ‘peace agreement’ and 
restoration of the state will have to find ways of resolving through due process, if new 
cycles of violence are not to resume (see Section 7 below). 
 
2.1.4 The role of the state 
 
The state before the 1990s claimed a monopoly of the means of violence, which in 
practice had ceased to exist in reality. Its protection increasingly narrowed to a small 
group of sub-clans that formed the leadership’s clientele. As armed rebellion spread to 
several areas in the 1980s, the state’s armed forces used severe repression against 
insurgents, especially against the SNM in the north-west and the whole clan on which 
it was based – eventually turning its artillery and planes against the city in which it 
was garrisoned. 
 
Since 1991, there has been no central state to offer protection – or to act as a major 
party to conflict. That is a unique feature of the Somalia case. However, 
administrations have come into existence in Somaliland, Puntland and in the Juba 
Valley Authority (JVA) area, which perform some state-like functions, including 
security, and more localised arrangements have succeeded in imposing some security 
by agreement.  
2.2  The significance of small arms and light weapons 
 
2.2.1 The supply and demand for SALW 
 
Small arms have been a feature of Somali society for a century or more, used as 
protection for self and for water points and grazing by men in a mainly pastoral 
society (see details in WSP, 2001: 234). Foreign suppliers have made possible major 
armed conflicts since the battles against the expanding Ethiopian empire characterised 
relations between the two societies from the late 19th Century. Colonial rule by 
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British, French and Italians was resisted by armed struggle – notably in the 20-year 
long guerrilla war led by Mohamed Abdulla Hassan, and small arms spread after his 
defeat by the British in the 1920s. In similar fashion, fascist Italy’s overthrow of 
indigenous leaders lead to a similar diffusion. Italian-led Somali troops dispersed with 
their weapons when the British defeated the Italians in major battles in World War II. 
Being restored to a trusteeship role, Italy rearmed local leaders and elders. During the 
independence struggle small arms found their way to nationalist forces from Yemen. 
After Independence, the new government similarly rewarded its client leaders with 
registered arms allocations. Moreover, the country’s strategic significance in the Cold 
War was recognised and led to a very well-equipped army. The Ethiopia-Somalia War 
of the 1970s lead to a massive escalation of weapons in the area.  
 
The defeat of the Somalia intervention army, and the later arming of a Western 
Somali Liberation movement in the Somali areas of Ethiopia in the 1980s, allowed the 
percolation of SALW to the population on both sides of the border. Opposition 
movements in several regions of Somalia, especially the SNM in the north-west and 
the SSDF in the north-east were in turn partly armed and supported by the Ethiopian 
government1 and used rear bases in Ethiopia, and these rebel groups also sought arms 
from other sources. However, with both regimes in desperate straits, they made a deal 
in 1988 to curb support to each other’s rebels, but that did little to reduce arms 
availability; indeed, the SNM responded by moving inside what is now Somaliland, to 
pursue a more guerrilla type struggle, involving the people more. The final escalation 
of all categories of weapons and their dissemination into society at large reached its 
peak after the overthrow of the government in 1991 (CDR, 2004: 25): 
• Military arsenals were destroyed or looted. 
• Heavy and light weapons fell into the hands of insurgents and the public. 
• Some of the heavy and light weapons eventually came under the control of 
militia groups. 
• Some remained in the hands of free-booting armed groups (mooryan). 
• There has been a free trade in arms and ammunition.  
• Businessmen, NGOs acquired SALW for protection, plus criminals. 
• Arms shipments continued unabated despite UNSC Resolution 733 of 1992 
prohibiting them. 
 
In February 2003 an independent Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary 
General found a “clear pattern of continuous and flagrant violations of the embargo”, 
pointing the finger at faction leaders, self-proclaimed administrations, businessmen 
and neighbouring governments. Some deliveries were initially made to militia groups, 
but as few fighters were paid, many weapons ended up on the open market. The 
extent of the proliferation through communities can be gauged from a finding from a 
European Commission (EC) study of 2003, which estimated that 64% of Somalis 
possessed one or more weapons (quoted in CRD, 2004). Many children have access to 
SALW. 
 
                                                 
1 There are differing  pictures about the extent of Ethiopian support for Somalia movements: a former 
US  diplomat in Ethiopia (Korn, 1986: 76) suggested that the SSDF “was practically a creation of the 
Ethiopian and Libyan governments”; the SNM relied primarily on the exile communities, and in 1988 
refused to be reined in by Ethiopia and moved its operations entirely inside its part of Somalia (Cliffe, 
1999: 91). 
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2.2.2 Who holds small arms, how are they used and why 
 
Somalia has seen a plethora of armed groups since 1991, but whereas they are largely 
contained if not disbanded in the north-west and north-east of the former Somalia 
Republic, they are still very much in evidence in much of south-central areas. One 
way of distinguishing these armed groups is between: 
 
• Factional militias – these are usually clan-based and were the major warring 
elements in the fight for state power in the early 1990s, who moved away from 
mutual confrontation to pursuit of private gain. These structures still exist, and 
their personnel have to be paid off or allowed to loot, but their relative strength is 
declining.  
• Business militia – the conduct of their trade and other activities has necessitated 
protection, either with recruited armed wings, or contracting out to one of the 
other armed groups. Protection is necessary in the context of armed violence but 
can be seen as a ‘tax’ on business. Thus these elements of the business community 
may act to some extent as promoters of security and peace. 
• Private security guards – in the climate of insecurity, private individuals, small 
businesses, local and international organisations employ security guards, usually 
drawn from the militias or freelance groups. They offer needed protection, based 
on work contracts, but can also be a danger if dissatisfied with their conditions of 
work. 
• Freelance armed groups (mooryan) – small autonomous groups, often with 
mixed clan composition, owing allegiance to no one. Emerging from deviant 
youth groups in earlier decades, they became from the late 1990s increasingly 
influential in South Central Somalia as guns for hire, or in pursuit of their own 
survival through violent crime and extortion. Containment and deterrence, and 
other civil society initiatives have been tried but CRD (2004; 29) concludes that: 
“Until the rule of law is restored and alternative livelihoods are available to the 
members of such groups, freelance militia are likely to remain a pervasive threat 
to security.” 
• Security personnel of shari’a courts in the south – especially in the major 
towns, these courts have emerged as independent would-be authorities, seeking to 
impose their own order, but also pursuing their own political agendas. 
 
2.2.4  Did the availability of arms spark the violence or follow it? 
 
“The proliferation of weapons is a contributing factor to insecurity in parts of 
Somalia but it is by no means the only cause – if it is a cause at all. Several 
areas, including Somaliland, Puntland and the central regions have known 
relative peace and security, although their populations are as heavily armed as 
that elsewhere in the country. A full understanding of the prevailing insecurity 
therefore demands a study of who possesses weapons and the purposes for 
which they are used.” (CRD, 2004: 25) 
 
It is mistaken to imagine that there was a period when SALW were not present in 
society and a moment when the local ‘market’ was opened, or that, as the Somalia 
National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) Committee has assumed, that the small 
arms ‘issue’ emerged only when the state’s monopoly on weapons was ended in 1991 
and they spread to ‘civilians’. It is correct that a far wider spread did occur then and 
  9
Armed violence and poverty in Somalia, Cliffe, March 2005 
that individual males did often seek them for protection, but protection was 
principally sought through the collectivity, and the spread was principally to various 
armed groups, There has been no shortage of weapons, through the market and 
supplied by neighbouring governments (see the reports in 2003 and 2004 of UN Panel 
of Exports on the Arms Embargo to Somalia) – a situation which has changed only 
very recently, as sources indicate that the free market price for an automatic hand 
weapon has risen to $300. 
 
2.2.5 Impact on human security 
 
These impacts are further explored in the next sections. It should also be stated that 
poverty and the particular forms it took in Somalia (see Jamal, 1988 for background) 
long pre-date the chronic insecurity of the 1990s and after. However, the availability 
of SALW and their use has given rise to a long, persistent climate of insecurity and 
fear in many parts of the country and this has had its own impact on lives and 
livelihoods generating new forms of poverty. As with some of the economic 
responses, some communities and individuals have developed resilience and modes of 
‘coping’ with the unknowns and fears of such situations. It has also to be recognised 
that the persistence of insecurity, the absence of a state in most areas, and the 
undermining of the capacities and legitimacy of indigenous checks on violence have 
all allowed for the emergence and institutionalising of a ‘climate of impunity’.  
 
Likewise the spread of arms had a distinctive impact on the shape of politics (which 
again pre-dated the 1990s): 
“… modern Somali state politics is nothing but traditional clan politics writ 
large, with the difference that the society today is armed with mass destructive 
weapons..” (Samatar, 1991). 
If this is how the narrowing political base of the former regime was seen, the armed 
violence since that was written shows a continuity, except that clan politics writ large 
plus SALW is what has characterised the politics of the struggle for a state. 
 
3. Social and cultural aspects of armed violence 
3.1 Cultural aspects 
 
3.1.1 Attitudes to armed violence, and to security  
 
Some commentators do suggest that owning a gun does fit with the strong male 
culture of fortitude and independence, and even that they have become status 
symbols, especially for young men.  However, others suggest that one should not 
overstate how strong this urge is as an explanatory factor. Observers of the 
international intervention of the early 1990s have, for instance, commentated that 
there was a widespread expectancy that when the US marines landed they would 
collect up the guns. Today too there are many Somalis who see SALW as the bane of 
their present predicament, calling for disarmament to be the urgent, number one 
action once a new government is formed (but see Section 7). The fear and insecurity, 
to be more precise the understandable belief by most people that no institution can be 
relied on to protect them, may well be a more important motive for each person 
wanting to keep a gun until security can be guaranteed. There is thus a paradox: most 
would like to see guns disappear off the street but will not be the first to hand them in. 
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Further adding to the paradox, is that identity with the clan and rallying to the cause 
when the clan seems threatened, seem to have become more marked in circumstances 
where no formal mechanisms for protection exist. At the end of the day, there is only 
the clan to rely on. 
 
Another feature of Somali society, one that is ‘cultural’ and also institutional that 
deserves important consideration, is the mechanisms for the management of conflict 
and violence (see; Menkhaus, 2000). Ahmed (2001) summarises its essentials: 
“The Somali social and political structure consists of clan families which sub-
divide into clans, sub-clans and dia-paying groups. The (latter) is the most stable 
(and smallest) political and social unit with a membership from several hundred 
men. The members … have a contractual (obligation) to support each other and to 
share the payment of ‘blood money’. Compensation is generally paid for killing or 
physical injuries – (in camels or other livestock traditionally). …  
Traditionally the social and political affairs of the clans have been managed by ad 
hoc councils that interpret the social contract (xeer) and deliberate on how best to 
resolve disputes. These assemblies have the authority to declare war or to make 
peace with other groups. Senior elders chair the assemblies.” 
 
Thus, there is an explicit social contract, agreements about the communal group 
paying compensation (diya) for violent injuries that ought to limit the reproduction of 
violence (although this collective assumption of responsibility does not necessarily 
discourage the individual from feeling a sense of impunity), plus mechanisms for 
negotiating resolution of violent conflict not necessarily always with third party 
mediators. As one Somali remarked: “We are experts in conflict resolution – precisely 
because we have so many conflicts”. These mechanisms have in fact played an 
important role – dramatically in the case of Somaliland and Puntland because they 
have come very much into play in promoting peace agreements there - but also in 
constraining armed violence elsewhere. However, the sheer scale of the bloodshed has 
posed a crisis for the diya-paying system and compensation has rarely been paid, 
although the system may have stored up a dam of claims that may be made later. The 
multiplicity and complexity of the conflicts have also been beyond the capacities of 
the clan-based mechanisms of resolution. Both trends mean that the limits to impunity 
have been transcended. Conflicts are resolved by force, and in the interests of the 
most powerful militarily, which in turn is to do with the weapons to hand. 
  
3.1.2 Gender dimensions 
 
Two dimensions are of special significance in the Somali context: one affects women 
as targets of armed violence; the other their potential role in peace-making. 
 
Several informants stressed how in traditional Somali values there were strong taboos 
against visiting violence on women and children:  
“Traditionally, in Somali pastoral society feuding and conflict were bounded 
by codes and social conventions. Along with the elderly and the sick, women 
and children were immune from attack. That is not to say that women were 
never targeted, but if they were harmed, there were rules about retribution and 
compensation.” (Musse, 2004: 69) 
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One informant stressed how a recent incident in the town of Baidoa when women 
were killed prompted widespread revulsion, and suggested that such incidents 
remained very much exceptions. However, Musse implies that they are more 
widespread, and in this area too, there is impunity from traditional sanctions:  
 
“Atrocities carried out by individuals and militia groups against women and girls 
in Somalia between 1991 and 1992 were unprecedented in Somali history. In the 
inter-clan warfare from 1991 onwards these traditional laws have played little 
part, and women as well as children and other non-fighters were attacked by 
warring factions with impunity.” 
 
A survey by UNICEF Somalia (2003) supports this latter view. It reported a 
widespread ‘culture of denial’ – 75% of the population believed that gender-based 
violence does not exist at all – yet 12% of adults and 8% of children attested to first-
hand knowledge of a rape victim. Timmons (2004) generalises this conclusion to 
argue that “violence against women dramatically escalated at the outset of the war, (as 
they had) no protection from clan structures” – although her work is based on 
secondary sources. She also asserts that their disconnection from the clan often meant 
that the households seldom received diya payments or other compensation. 
 
One traditional practice reinforced prospects for resolving or pre-empting conflict. 
Marriages often involved women marrying outside their clan or sub-clan. Indeed this 
was sometimes an explicit tactic for peaceful resolution of disputes or past conflict. 
Thus, women had links with other clans, potentially placing them in a position to 
negotiate or at least provide bridges. Women have indeed played a key role in some of 
the agreements of the last decade. They were supposed to have a set of reserved seats 
in the new parliament formed in September 2004, but it was felt ‘convenient’ by the 
participants and the international brokers to forget this provision to make for more 
compromise between warlords and factions. Yet, women’s role in peace-making has 
also been undermined by social trends resulting from the armed violence.  Clan 
loyalties are being exerted to push women into marrying within, thereby undermining 
a traditional counterbalance to the centrifugal nature of Somali society. 
 
3.2  Social capital and armed violence 
 
3.2.1 Social relationships and power dynamics  
 
The trends in marriage practice referred to above are part of more profound changes 
in the institution of marriage which have occurred in the climate of insecurity and 
disappearance of social norms: 
“In the decade and a half since the onset of the Somali crisis, the institution of 
marriage has undergone such a transformation as to be almost unrecognisable 
today. Many weddings now occur without the involvement, knowledge or blessing 
of parents. There has been a dramatic increase in the rate of teenage marriages and 
a proportional increase in the rate of teenage divorce – often leaving young 
mothers alone to raise their children.” (CRD, 2004: 37) 
 
The massive insecurity and sweeping displacement have also put great strain on other 
kinship relationships and the obligations that go with them, and on the links within 
non-kin groups like the dia-paying group. Support for displaced and impoverished is 
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thus threatened, although social and religious norms to provide alms do still operate 
and are an important means of food security in some South-Central areas (see section 
4 below). 
 
Another dimension of social capital that has been an important check on 
impoverishment are arrangements whereby owners of larger herds will loan or lodge 
lactating animals or some breeding stock with poor families to provide children’s food 
or to help replenish devastated small herds. Such practices do persist, but seem to be 
less in evidence, as larger herders accumulate in the war economy (see section 4 
below), while those who lost the few beasts they had moved, sometimes permanently, 
to towns.  
 
4. The political economy of armed violence 
 
Given the long-lasting nature of the crisis in Somalia, there has been time and space 
for a very vigorous war economy to develop. As this section details, some parts of 
that economy have prospered despite and even as a consequence of the armed 
violence. In the case of South-Central Somalia, it would be inaccurate to speak of a 
‘parallel’ ‘informal’ or ‘alternative’ economy. The war economy is the economy; 
virtually the whole of it is informal. It incorporates those adaptable components of the 
pre-war economy, like livestock trading and fishing, but has given rise to new 
enterprises, most of which would be considered illicit if there were law enforcement. 
 
The trade in weapons is both a dimension of that trade and the underpinning needed to 
be an actor in this market. Somalia is to some extent the pivot of a regional and even 
international arms trade. Weapons come in, often on small boats, to Somalia’s 
unregulated ports, and are a source of the revenues that legitimate self-proclaimed 
authorities and that factions rely on to survive. They, in turn, supply neighbouring 
countries, e.g., through the ‘Somali’ suburb of Eastleigh in Nairobi, which are able to 
recycle the arms deliveries to faction militias from neighbouring states. 
 
Another critical, massive and regional trade is in the narcotic chewing twigs, khat or 
qat, which is of the order of $100 million in value per year. It benefits the traders and 
growers, mainly in the Ethiopian and Kenyan highlands, but impoverishes the Somali 
people as they try to feed their habit, and may dampen energies, even if it does, as is 
claimed, stave off the awareness of hunger (see Green, 1999). 
 
The period of intense armed conflict in the early 1990s was characterised by struggles 
to control real estate in the towns and occupy productive land, often for speculative 
purposes, and by asset stripping as virtually all public buildings and facilities were 
looted and stripped. The economy in this period was also greatly affected by the 
impact of the UN operations and associated relief and humanitarian supplies from 
other bodies – again becoming the site of struggle to control the lucrative gains to be 
had from controlling these supplies and from protection. Such struggles generated 
winners and losers. 
 
A Puntland survey (WSP, 2001) documented other, continuing activities of “freelance 
armed youth living on the spoils of the gun”: 
• Roadblocks to extract levies on the main arterial roads; 
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• Piracy in the sea lanes of Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, while protecting illegal 
and debilitating (over-)fishing operations; 
• Protection racket for illegal burning of trees for charcoal exports. 
All these rackets in turn generated further insecurity for others – in a period from the 
mid-1990s when there was otherwise relative security. 
 
This non-formal economy requires finances. Remittances from the diaspora are on a 
massive scale, perhaps $1 billion annually, more than double the estimate of US$370 
million annually in the 1980s (Marchal, et. al, 2000, and UNICEF, 1991, respectively, 
cited in UNDP, 2002:104). They allow many Somali families to survive. One estimate 
suggests that about 40% of these transfers support consumption. The larger portion is 
used for ‘investment’ in trade and in production, but also in arms and supporting 
armed groups. 
 
Over the past decade Somalia has seen a rapid growth in private sector involvement in 
virtually all sectors of the economy. It has also been described recently as ‘the most 
privatised country in Africa’ (UNDP, 2002).  
 
5. The impact of armed violence on poverty  
 
5.1 Directly affected 
 
5.1.1 The human costs of conflict 
 
It is unlikely that the real human costs of Somalia’s civil wars and ensuing political 
violence and lawlessness will ever be known, although they have been massive. The 
available official figures  (see Table 1, below) put the number of people killed in 
fighting in 1988 and in 1991-92 at 90,000.  Of these, some 50,0002 were killed in 
1988 alone during fighting between government and SNM forces in the northern 
towns of Burao and Hargeisa.  There are no figures for the number of civilians killed 
in the fighting and no data on the number of people killed in the two ensuing civil 
wars in the northwest (1991-92 & 1994-96).  Nor are there any figures for those killed 
in the political violence that swept virtually all of central and southern Somalia in the 
aftermath of the 1991-92 civil war. Recent estimates have been made from surveys 
(UNDP & World Bank, 2003: Table 1.12) of what proportion of all deaths in 2001-2 
was as a result of ‘war’ or mines. Although the levels of armed violence were much 
reduced they were responsible for 11.7% of all deaths, a huge proportion. These 
estimates also suggest that armed violence has much greater impact in the urban than 
the rural areas – 9.2% of deaths there are war-related (excluding ‘mines’) as opposed 
to 1.9%. 
 
As the data show, by far the greatest number of war-related deaths occurred in 
southern Somalia during the 1991-92 drought and famine that affected some 3 million 
people inhabiting the predominantly agro-pastoral Bay and Bakol regions and the 
agricultural, inter-riverine areas in the Jubba and Shebelle valleys. The latter areas 
comprise Somalia’s most fertile croplands, much of them irrigated formerly. Since the 
1950s, the southern-most regions have been home to a mix of minority groups – Digil 
and Rahanweyn, Shebelle, Gabwing and various Bantu groups. Many of them were 
                                                 
2 Some estimates put the numbers killed during fighting in the northwest at 100,000, with 50,000 killed in 
Hargeisa alone. See, for example, Bake (1993) cited in Ahmed & Green (1999: 120). 
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forcibly dispossessed of their lands and reduced to agricultural labourers in a process 
of ‘land-grabbing’ that began in the late 1960s, but took on an accelerated form in the 
1980s when those closely associated with the Siad Barre regime forcibly acquired vast 
areas of irrigable land. In the 1980s, the latter was highly prized more as a source of 
collateral for obtaining loans from aid donors than for its agricultural potential.  These 
areas have born the brunt of conflict both during and in the aftermath of the 1991-92 
civil war, as competing factions have sought to maintain or gain control of these 
highly contested lands, which, with the exception of Mogadishu, have suffered the 
most serious devastation. 
 
 Table 1: Human costs of conflict 
 
 Latest available data Year 
No. of people killed in fighting  50,000 killed in northwest Somalia  1988 
 40,000 killed in south and central Somalia 1991/92 
No. of deaths resulting from the 
combined effects of war &drought  
 
240,000-280,000 died from starvation and 
disease 
 
1991/92 
 
Internally displaced persons 
 
 
 
 
Refugees (neighbouring countries 
only) 
 
 
556,000- 636,000 ‘visible’ displaced persons, 
total number possibly over 1.6m 1
300,000 (the largest concentrations are found in 
Mogadishu, 150,000, and Kismaayo, 15,0002)    
 
600,000   
800, 0003 
246,400 
 
 
Sept. 1992 
 
2001 
 
1988 
1992 
2001 
Source: UNDP (2002), pp.58-61 & Table C, p.199, unless otherwise stated. 
1 World Bank (1993), cited in UNDP (200), p.60. 
2  Narbeth & Mclean (2003). 
3 US Committee for Refugees (2001).  
 
In 1991, prior to the on-set of the drought, the predominantly small-scale farming 
civilian population of the agro-pastoral areas of Bay and Bakol was deliberately 
targeted both by government forces and by Aideed’s militia. Alongside the 
destruction of villages, infrastructure and agricultural implements, crops were 
destroyed or looted, animals were killed or stolen, forcing hundreds of farmers to flee 
to Baidoa, the regional capital, which became the epicentre of the famine (see, for 
example, Ahmed & Green, 1999).  At the height of the civil war ‘The inter-riverine 
people were trapped between Aideed’s forces in the north, Barre’s in the south-west, 
and Morgan’s – Barre’s son-in-law – in the south, in what became known as the 
‘triangle of death’. Baidoa, the capital of the region, became also known as the ‘city 
of the walking dead’” (Mukhtar, 1996: 551, cited in Ahmed & Green, 1999: 120).  
The Juba and Shebelle regions nearer the coast were also targetted, farmland was 
occupied by invading pastoralists who were unable to cultivate it; irrigation works 
were destroyed. Official estimates put the number of deaths during the famine at 
between 240,000 and 280,000. Other estimates, however, suggest the number of 
deaths may be as high as 500,000 (ibid).  Many of the deaths resulted from outbreaks 
of infectious diseases as thousands fled to relief camps in and around major towns.  
Baidoa town, in particular, suffered tremendously during the famine as a result of the 
blocking and appropriation of emergency relief supplies by Aideed’s forces. These 
southern regions have continued to be the worst affected by armed violence even up 
to the present, as will be discussed in section 5.2, although periods of stability and 
islands of security have also been created. 
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5.1.2 Women and children 
 
Several aspects of the direct impact on women and the extent to which they have been 
specifically targeted for armed violence, were discussed under ‘Gender Dimensions’ 
above. Some of the broader issues of women in families and communities are 
discussed under ‘Households’ below. One impact of the continued armed violence 
and the changes in social relations reviewed above should be noted here because of its 
consequences for what happens to households and women within them. Several 
reports show that the proportion of households that are headed by women has 
significantly increased in the period since 1991. In one study in the South it was as 
high as 40% of all households – a proportion higher than almost anywhere else in 
Africa – and among IDPs was 75%. 
 
Children of course suffer when their households are impoverished, but also suffer 
particular fates. The direct casualties from armed violence and the general disruption 
of homes and residence leave many children as orphans or without primary care-
givers. UNICEF Somalia (2003) reports that despite still strongly voiced beliefs that 
orphans should be cared for by relatives, the economic and social strains of the last 
few years have reduced many families’ capabilities to give that care. Their survey 
reported that about one third of all households reported situations where one or more 
of their children had required care in another family, considerably fewer reported 
hosting non-biological children. These conditions force increasing numbers to seek to 
survive as street children, which in Mogadishu in particular exposes them to violence 
and to drugs. Only 2% of those included in the UNICEF survey were reported to be 
now living on the streets, but 19% said that they or their siblings had done so at some 
time. 
 
There is, as noted, a strong cultural inhibition against harming children, and in the 
same vein there is a strong attitude against involving them in militias. Nevertheless, 
such restraints are being eroded in practice. The UNICEF Somalia 2003 survey 
reported that 5% of the children surveyed said that they or their siblings had carried a 
gun or been involved in militias. There is again a marked regional variation of 
involvement depending on political situation and the degree of security, and far more 
in urban than rural areas. 
 
5.1. 3 Displaced 
 
In addition to the enormous toll exacted in terms of human lives lost, hundreds of 
thousands of Somalis have been internally displaced or forced to flee to countries 
within the region and outside Africa.  The first major refugee flight occurred in 1988 
when over 600,000, predominantly Issaq, people fled from the north-west (what is 
now Somaliland) from summary executions, aerial bombardments and ground attacks 
on villages and the cities of Hargeisa and Burao by government forces, including 
special troops known as the ‘Isaaq Exterminating Wing’ (Dabar-goynta Isaaqa). 
They fled to eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti in what has been described as ‘one of the 
fastest and largest forced population movements ever recorded in Africa’ (UNDP, 
2002: 58). Although some 400,000 of the refugees in Ethiopia returned spontaneously 
following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, an estimated 90,000 fled again in 
1994 when civil war erupted in Hargeisa and Burao. Since then refugees have been 
successfully returning from Ethiopia to Somaliland under a UNHCR repatriation 
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programme. This attests to the security in the area. The support for resettlement they 
receive, and which has been extended to bolster receiving communities, ensures a 
transition not marked by impoverishment.  
 
However, the mass displacement of Somalis took place after 1991.  According to 
official figures, in 1992 the number of refugees in neighbouring countries was 
800,000; the number of internally displaced people (IDP) was between 556,000 and 
636,000, although some estimates numbered the IDP as high as 1.6 million (see Table 
1, above). People continued to leave Somalia in large numbers up until 1995.  Since 
then there has been a decline in refugee flows and a gradual process of repatriation 
and reintegration. Official figures for 2001 put the number of Somali refugees in 
neighbouring states and the number of  the IDP at 246,400 and 300,000, respectively, 
with the highest concentration of IDPs found in Mogadishu. However, these latter 
figures are based on those living in IDP camps, whereas the actual number of IDP - 
including those less ‘visible’ IDP supported by kinfolk and those who have taken up 
temporary or forced resettlement - is likely to be much higher. The gender impact is 
illustrated by figures from a 2001 UNDP Study of the camps and their inhabitants in 
Mogadishu, which indicated that about 75% of the households were women- headed. 
The decline in refugee flows and internal displacement in the latter half of the decade 
is attributed to the improved security situation inside parts of Somalia after 1995 and 
to the hard and inhospitable environment of refugee camps; and, since 2001, to the 
tighter asylum policies in the West. (UNDP, 2002: 59) 
 
The returnees and those still displaced are among the poorest of the poor in many 
areas. For instance, a survey of urban livelihoods in the southern town of Belet Weyne 
(Adams et al., 2003) starkly reveals the realities of life for these victims of armed 
violence from elsewhere. Of the small category recognised as ‘very poor’ almost all 
were IDP. Typically, they lodged with earlier arrivees in small huts, had no access to 
land themselves and relied on just casual labour (transporting or caring for other 
people’s livestock, washing clothes, carrying fodder, collecting rubbish, including 
left-over khat). This group was dependent on the alms of the better-off for 30% of 
their food on average. They used river water not tapped, relied on the Koranic school 
as they could not afford formal education. They did have access to free care at a 
medical post, but had no access to doctors. Most other IDPs were classified as ‘poor’, 
and along with the less well-off of locals, accounted for one third of the population, 
receiving a slightly higher income but with the same limited access to services. They 
were found, however, not to be food insecure, in absolute terms, but were dependent 
for basic survival on the largesse of the better-off and some isolated livelihood 
support provision by NGOs. 
 
Evidence from the port of Kismaayo, further south, which has the second largest IDP 
population after Mogadishu (with almost 50% of the total), offers a similar picture. 
There most of the displaced live in crowded camps, in rudimentary structures, with 
inadequate sanitary facilities, relying on contaminated river water, while others who 
can afford buy water. All schooling has to be paid for and thus is not available to most 
IDP children. Those from weak and powerless ‘minority’ clans may feel safer in 
camps, although they are still discriminated against in relief provision and in jobs and 
other earning prospects. Aid gatekeepers skew such relief aid as is available reputedly 
keeping as much as 75%. Kismaayo has been the scene of persistent fighting between 
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militia, changing hands a number of times and each time retreating militia looted and 
pillaged, and incoming militia did likewise (Narbeth & Mclean, 2003). 
 
A different process of displacement affected the north-east regions. In violent fighting 
in the south, bordering the areas controlled from Mogadishu, many thousands fled 
north. A 1993 peace agreement, which became the basis for stability in the north-east 
generally, led to massive further displacement from the contested border areas 
northwards to the more secure regions, releasing in the process thousands of former 
militia fighters and freelance armed youth into the community. Another flow occurred 
as a consequence of the ‘clan-cleansing’ in the far south. People from the Harti and 
other sub-clans of the Darood clan family took refuge in the city of Kismaayo, and 
then in turn in Kenya. Many of these were officially ‘repatriated’ by UNHCR in the 
mid-1990s to the north-east, the ‘home’ area associated with the Darood clan, and 
many others moved there of their own accord. Coping with this influx was a major 
challenge to the newly emerging administration of Puntland and local NGOs, left 
unassisted by international bodies pre-occupied with the South-Centre. Paradoxically, 
the arrivals had a positive impact in Puntland, as it “reversed the debilitating out-
migration and brain drain … prompted by underdevelopment and harsh conditions” in 
previous decades (WSP, 2001). Skilled and formerly wealthy people brought their 
remaining funds, their entrepreneurial talents and knowledge to invest in the towns. 
However, the poorer were often forced by bleak urban prospects to revert to their 
forebears’ traditions of livestock husbandry. The area now faces a problem with the 
prospect of peace: will the entrepreneurs return to urban areas like Mogadishu and 
Kismaayo where there may be greater opportunities? 
 
5.2 The indirect impacts 
 
5.2.1 Household and livelihood levels 
 
Some of the most telling aggregate data about the correlation of household income 
with levels of stability or violence is found in the results of a survey (UNDP & World 
Bank, 2003: 23) of how average per capita income is unevenly distributed through 
Somalia’s 18 regions. Before the war, some of the southern regions, where there was 
commercial agriculture, and the Banadir region that contained the capital, with its 
industry and services, were generally considered to be better-off. Today the six 
regions in the less well-endowed Somaliland and Puntland rank with Banadir as the 
best off, with their regional per capita income levels significantly higher than the 
national average of $226. The eight regions with incomes lower than the national 
average are all insecure areas in the Centre-South of the country, and include several 
where commercial agriculture was found. 
 
The same dramatic portrait of the uneven regional impact of persistent violence as 
opposed to that in stable areas is evident in maps produced by the Food Security 
Analysis Unit of the UN FAO (FSAU) in charting nutritional trends (see Map 1). 
They show that a significant proportion of people in all areas of Somalia suffer from 
acute malnutrition. However, the level is less than 10% in the north-west (which 
would still be enough in other countries to trigger a ‘humanitarian emergency’ by 
accepted international norms) and between 10-15% in the north-east – the two areas 
with relative security. In contrast, in much of the Central-South it is between 15% and 
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20%, while in the southern corner neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, it is an 
astonishing 20% plus.  
 
The cumulative impact of long periods of insecurity leads FSAU to adopt a position in 
their reports where “The word ‘normal’ is deliberately avoided when referring to 
malnutrition rates in Somalia as ‘normal’ by international standards is very rarely 
seen” (FSAU, 2004: 14). As a consequence their analyses do not simply monitor 
whether there is at any moment a crisis, whether a result of natural or armed violence 
causes, that can be labeled an ‘humanitarian emergency’ in conventional ‘agency 
speak’; they refer to a persistent ‘livelihoods crisis’ which is a permanent condition 
for significant proportions of people. However, as this research was being conducted, 
there were clear symptoms of an ‘emergency’ mainly as a result of a prolonged 
drought for three years in some places, impacting to push the many vulnerable people 
even further below livelihood survival levels. The drought was most severe in the 
central and northern areas affecting in particular the livelihood position of pastoralists, 
who were losing large proportions of their herds and finding the terms of trade 
moving against them as they sought to realize some of the decline in household assets, 
their livestock, to buy food. These crisis conditions are beginning to change the afore-
mentioned regional disparities, with the northern pastoralists suffering a decline even 
with their better security situation. Whether that worsening in their relative livelihood 
situation will be temporary depends on whether their better security situation is taken 
advantage of by outside support for replenishing herds after the drought. However, 
much of the southern population has also experienced a massive decline in their last 
harvest, and also has had to try and weather this latest crisis from a situation where 
they had been generally more vulnerable. In some southern areas, the 2004 crisis has 
also been fuelled by renewed armed violence as well as drought. With the 
implementation of a peace agreement finally in the offing, an invasion by a militia 
under General Morgan in August and September 2004 has threatened the JVA and the 
security its administration has been able to set up in recent years around Kismaayo. 
The consequences have been renewed displacement of people, some to Kenya others 
to rural areas, and the burning down of markets, and a further escalation of the prices 
of cereals, already in short supply and now “unaffordable to most citizens” (OCHA, 
September 2004). Delivery of humanitarian relief has, as in 1992-3, been interrupted 
in this area and by clashes between sub-clans in Belet Weyne further north, and 
generally in the Lower Shebelle and Lower Juba regions where “freelance militias 
continue to maintain a high number of road blocks limiting access to the area and 
increasing transport costs for food commodities” (OCHA, August 2004). 
 
By and large the impact on livelihoods obtained primarily from livestock have not 
been as dramatic. Overall there has been growth in the livestock economy (see section 
5.2.3): although estimates are not precise, there seems to have been a continuing 
increase in the size of herds of camels, cattle, goats and sheep, and significant 
increase in livestock marketed, especially as exports. But the livelihood benefits have 
not been experienced across the board. There is some evidence that the larger 
numbers have been accompanied by a polarisation in ownership, with smaller herders 
becoming more numerous and many dropping out of the pastoralist life entirely or 
becoming equally dependent on casual earnings. This burden on the poor has been 
emphasised by a shift toward a more widespread and intensive pattern of trade, that 
had been significantly commercialised for decades, and in turn a shift in the diet.  
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Map 1: Nutritional status trends in Somalia, 1999-20043
                                                 
3 Reproduced by kind permission from the Food Security Analysis Unit of the UN FAO. 
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Pastoralists have always disposed of some of their natural increase often as much 
through barter as formal markets to meet needs for food other than livestock products, 
but the proportion of the latter in subsistence seems to have declined. Livestock sales 
become more important as food requirements have shifted to grain and other imported 
products (APD, 2002) but those with small or no animals have found this means of 
subsistence more and more difficult to sustain. 
 
The picture provided by most of the information summarised above is an aggregate 
view of livelihoods by regions and agro-ecological zones. These data obscure what 
seems to be growing inequality between households observed in both pastoral and 
agricultural communities. The number and proportion of the ‘vulnerable’ – a status 
that derives from a prolonged period of asset depletion and disruptions of life – and of 
the ‘poor’ has been increasing (UNDP, 2002). Within this pattern the increase in the 
number of women-headed households noted above means that most of that category 
of families, with few or no livestock or access to secure land rights, inevitably find 
themselves among the vulnerable and are impoverished when emergencies such as the 
recent drought come along. 
 
5.2.2 Impacts of armed violence on social infrastructure and human 
capital 
 
The state collapse in 1991 saw the destruction of virtually all public buildings and 
facilities and thus much of the basic social service infrastructure, which was almost 
entirely provided by the state. The inevitable decline in the provision of social 
services (summarised in Table 2 below has been partially reversed in some regions in 
the late 1990s,. Nevertheless educational provision in 2001 was below the levels in 
the early 1980s and below neighbouring countries. Adult literacy had fallen from 24% 
pre-war to 17%. There has been almost no secondary or higher education at all for 
over 12 years. The development impact has been underlined by the UNDP Human 
Development Report 2001: 
 
“The collapse of Somalia’s educational system constitutes a societal 
emergency, which will constrain development for decades.” (UNDP 2002: 85) 
 
Similarly health indicators are among the worst in the world (UNDP, 2002). The 
recovery since 1998 in provision of some social services, such as primary school 
enrolment, and modest improvements in some health indicators, such as infant and 
under-five mortality rates, is very uneven regionally. It is very much correlated with 
the existence of security and stability, being greatest in areas previously considered 
the most marginalized and deprived. 
 
Somalia has seen some recovery in some of its basic services. In the absence of state 
structures in the South-Centre and of any liberation movement with any humanitarian 
or development arm (like those in Eritrea, Tigray in the past and Southern Sudan 
today) the driving force of Somalia’s social service sector is the Somali private sector.  
Private health services have grown significantly over the past decade and, according 
to one estimate, accounted for as much as 90 per cent of all curative health care in the 
latter half of the 1990s (Development Solutions for Africa, 1997; cited in UNDP, 
2002: 78).  Yet, because most of them run on the basis of full-cost recovery, the 
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facilities are priced out of reach for households with middle levels of income let alone 
the poor. 
 
Somaliland and Puntland offer some partial exceptions to this dominance of private 
provision. Authorities in the latter have reopened four of the six main hospitals in its 
various regions with the help of NGOs and donor support and provide some 
regulation of the health sector. With a legacy of relative neglect of its educational 
provision before 1991, the administration with Community Education Committees 
(CEC) and external agencies was able to reopen many primary school classes, but 
lack of revenues has made it difficult to meet recurrent costs to keep them open after 
initial support (e.g. from food-for-work or other support) came to an end. As of the 
end of the 1990s most districts did not even have upper primary schools, let alone 
secondary or higher education provision (WSP, 2001). The better-off could afford the 
fees plus the expense of sending their children to private schools and colleges in the 
main towns, but this provision has excluded the poor – and many girls. Somaliland 
has been most successful in social service provision: the security in the centre of the 
area allowed communities and NGOs to (re-)open schools, including secondary and 
some small private universities, which did receive some regular support from state 
revenues. But these were only enough in 2000 to cover 3% of estimated recurrent 
costs (UNDP, 2002). Nevertheless the central region of Woqonyi Galbeed had 
achieved enrolment of over 40,000 in primary school, higher even than in the much 
more populous Benadir region that includes the capital, Mogadishu (UNDP, 2002). 
Further illustrative of the positive impact, the Bay region chalked up an almost tenfold 
increase in primary enrolment in one year after the establishment of a RRD authority 
in mid-1999. 
 
5.2.3 Macro-economic impacts (production, investment, trade etc) 
 
Somalia has always been one of the poorest countries in the world. Now it has been 
relegated to 161st position out of 163 in the UNDP’s Human Development Index of 
2001. The country’s GDP per capita has worsened in the period of civil strife, absence 
of government and continuing insecurity from $280 in 1989 to an estimated $226 in 
2002. Overall agricultural production remains far below pre-war levels, although there 
was a partial recovery in 2000 (UNDP, 2002), and food security shows little 
improvement after the droughts of the early 1990s and 1998-99. The country is faced 
with a long-term decline in the terms of trade for the crucial exports of livestock. 
Large amounts of capital, labour and agricultural land all remain unutilised because of 
the insecurity. 
 
Paradoxically, however, there has been something of an economic boom in private 
sector activity, at least in the eyes of some analysts. In an early argument along these 
lines, Mubarak (1997) suggested that the informal market provided a functioning 
system that facilitated private sector activity, and did so more effectively than the 
previous regime’s repressive policies and economic controls. However, he attributes 
this positive economic impact to the absence of government, while admitting that the 
economy has suffered from the violence of the civil war. He also admits that the 
economic ‘boom’ was confined to those areas where “local communities have 
succeeded in providing order and security”.  
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Table 2. Somalia: selected human development indicators 
 
 1985-90 1995-97 2001-02 
Population: 
     Total (million) 
     Urban (%)  
 
Education: 
Adult literacy rate (%) 
     Urban (%) 
     Rural (%) 
Primary school enrolment ratio 
     Boys (%) 
     Girls (%) 
Secondary school enrolment ratio 
Tertiary enrolment ratio  
 
Health: 
Life expectancy at birth (yrs) 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Maternal mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
% of population with access to at least one health 
facility   
     Urban  (%) 
     Rural & nomadic (%) 
% of population with access to safe (treated) water     
     Urban (%) 
     Rural (%)   
 
Public expenditure (as % of GNP): 
     Education 
     Health 
     Military  
 
7.5 
23.5 
 
 
24.0 
- 
- 
18.0 
- 
- 
10.0 
3.0 
 
 
47.0 
152 
275 
1,600 
28.01 
- 
- 
29.01 
- 
-
 
 
6.0 
0.2 
4.4 
 
6.38 
- 
 
 
15.5 
- 
- 
11.5 
- 
- 
0.4 
- 
 
 
47.0 
132 
224 
1,600 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
6.81 
34.01 
 
 
17.1 
34.91 
10.91 
17.1 
20.81 
12.71 
1.1 
0.1 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
54.81 
62.7 
36.4
20.51 
53.1 
4.1 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
1  UNDP & World Bank, 2003, p.xii.;  All other statistics are reproduced from UNDP (2002), Ch.5, 
various tables.  
 
Peter Little’s book (2003) uses a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the pastoral 
economy to support similar conclusions about the resilience of that economy and of 
some of those engaged in it. They have the advantages of a politico-military strength 
derived from their lifestyle and can protect their assets by mobility. His research has 
been based on the trade of pastoralists in the south-west of the country who were able 
to reorient their trade in livestock from the Somali ports, caught up in the contest for 
control of them by faction militias, toward neighbouring Kenya – achieving 
considerable economic benefit in the process. Their benefits derive not from a 
perverse effect of the armed violence, but from their resilience in the teeth of that kind 
of threat. Certainly the trade in live animals to Saudi Arabia increased after 1991, as a 
result of deregulation, benefitting the north as well as the areas bordering Kenya; the 
through-put from Berbera port in Somaliland was greater at the end of the 1990s than 
before the war. However, a ban on exports from the Horn of Africa to Saudi Arabia 
because of fears of Rift Valley Fever interrupted this trend from 1997 and then again 
after 1999. 
 
One critic of the thesis (Menkhaus, 2003b) does not gainsay that those with 
sustainable if not sizeable herds in one part of the country have benefited from these 
openings. However, he contrasts their fate with that of agriculturalists in the 
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neighbouring inter-riverine areas who often lost access to their lands and found their 
irrigation works destroyed, or that of more impoverished small herders or herdless 
and the many minorities found in southern Somalia. Mubarak similarly acknowledges 
that many people have had their prospects worsened despite the resilience of the 
market: the many displaced, the very large numbers of urban unemployed. Recent 
estimates (UNDP & World Bank, 2003: xii) put unemployment at almost half of the 
labour force, and at 65.5% in the towns. Little (2003) likewise cautions readers “not 
to equate the relative success of certain segments of Somali economy and society with 
an overly rosy picture that ‘all is well in Somalia’. … The Somali paradox has some 
‘winners’, but it also has had many, many ‘losers’, including women and children and 
Somali minority groups” – plus refugees and displaced. 
 
Apart from the livestock economy, growth has been experienced in other areas of 
trade, notably the export of charcoal (with its worrying environmental impacts) and 
the import of khat (estimated to net $100m to traders per year). Innovation has 
emerged as people contend with the breakdown of services and infrastructure: new, 
but small-scale hi-tech telecommunications, financial services to make available the 
massive scale of remittances from the diaspora and to finance trade and the expansion 
of private airlines in the region as well as internally. 
 
5.3 Regional and international levels 
 
The successive phases of armed violence in Somalia have all been affected, usually 
aggravated, by regional factors. War began in the 1970s as part of the aim of uniting 
Somalis found in neighbouring states. Ethiopia consistently, and other countries 
sporadically, fuelled internal conflicts inside the former Republic of Somalia by 
supplying arms and providing sanctuary and diplomatic backing. Neighbouring 
countries have frequently backed one internal faction against another, either to get the 
kind of political outcome in Somalia that would suit them or as part of proxy wars 
with other states. States in the region have also been destabilised by Somalia’s 
conflicts. 
 
The porous borders around the country have facilitated trade, often illicit, and 
weapons transfers as well as population movement of nomadic pastoralists, traders or 
combatants. The latter may have intensified armed struggles by providing sanctuary, 
but may also have ameliorated impoverishment, allowing pastoralists to find water or 
grazing when their livelihoods are threatened. Labour migration can also provide 
some additional source for livelihoods of those with limited assets. In Balet Weyn, for 
instance, a Save the Children survey found that many poor households depend on one 
bread-winner working in Ethiopia, where there are jobs in a secure environment, on a 
casual basis (Adams, 2003). Some household heads were absent for nine months a 
year. While this additional source provides immediate support for survival prospects, 
its long-term sustainability and its impact on families pose problems for the future. 
 
One crucial international linkage has been the channelling of remittances from the 
Somalia diaspora around the world. As indicated above, these have been a vital source 
of livelihood support for many households and communities (but not necessarily 
spread evenly), and have provided by far the largest source of foreign exchange and 
fuelled such economic recovery as has occurred (Ahmed, 2000). But as some 
informants noted these are also used to fuel arms purchases and recruitment by armed 
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groups. However, their flow was interrupted by post 9/11 measures against 
international banking mechanisms used by Somalis, notably the al-Barakaat 
organisation, which were suspected of being transits for funds to support ‘terrorism’ – 
even if such individual payments might have used these channels, there were 
thousands of transactions between ordinary Somalis which were disrupted by these 
measures. A number of spontaneous, and more recently donor, initiatives have 
reduced the impact of these obstacles to the country receiving this life blood. 
 
6. Overall impact on poverty 
 
6.1 Can poverty processes and impacts be attributed to SALW? 
 
These processes and impacts can only be indirectly attributed to SALW, as we have 
seen. The latter is only a contributing factor in a complex set of forces creating an 
overall situation of insecurity and impunity where armed violence is persistent and 
has been a enduring dimension of existence, of livelihoods and of social and 
economic realities. This overall situation does indeed generate poverty. Somalia’s 
mixed fortunes in the last 10 years, with areas where peace and security have been 
established and arms removed from active use, and the incidence of armed violence 
reduced, alongside continuing disruption and violent conflict in areas where no 
political process has provided for security while arms available to both kinds of areas, 
indicates that SALW availability is not a prime cause of insecurity or poverty. All that 
might be hazarded is that the ready availability of SALW might be responsible for 
some additional percentage of the levels of armed violence and perhaps the levels of 
poverty. 
 
7. Implications for aid programming 
 
7.1 The relationship between development and humanitarian aid 
programming and SALW programming 
 
7.1.1 Disarmament and arms reduction  
 
One of the most immediate issues at this critical juncture in Somalia is how to deal 
with the issue of disarmament, especially its phasing and linkage with peace-building, 
reconciliation and recovery. The Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC), 
which began under Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) auspices 
in October 2002 managed to get all faction leaders to sign a declaration agreeing a 
constitutional framework for a five year transition under a federal government. With 
support and pressure from international bodies and major governments the last few 
weeks have seen the choosing, on a clan basis, of a transitional parliament, which now 
in turn is electing a president and government. Preparations are already under way to 
launch a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme 
(DDR) and other transitional programmes. Given the widespread availability of arms 
and the recognition that little can be done to immediately restore the rule of law and 
establish the new state’s capacity to maintain peace and order, there is a natural 
presumption that an early step, some would say prerequisite, should be a programme 
of disarmament. Indeed, this was a strong and strategic recommendation of one of the 
working committees of the SNRC that was working on DDR to have a quick, total 
and simultaneous collection of weapons throughout the country in the first six months 
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of transition. Some observers feel that it was precisely the failure to pursue such 
disarmament that lead to the broader failure of the UN intervention 12 years ago. 
Outside actors in donor agencies and international bodies who are preoccupied with 
the consequences of the extraordinary wide diffusion of arms tend to make the same 
assumption. One commentator suggested that NGOs might have a vested interest in 
promoting a disarmament agenda – partly because the peace process especially in 
South-Central Somalia is basically seen as an ‘aid programme’, for where else will the 
revenues come from except the donors? 
 
However, a whole series of interviewees, Somali and international, who have practical 
experience of the realities on the ground, stressed the unrealism of this hope. There 
would be no means of enforcing compliance; no obvious incentive was being mooted. 
Thus, given the long period of insecurity and the reliance on SALW as a means of 
livelihood and self-defence, these people rather prioritise the establishment of a 
climate of security and the provision of alternative livelihoods as prior means to 
encourage eventual collection of SALW. However, agreement to effect the 
decommissioning of the ‘technicals’ and other heavy weapons which are in the hands 
of the main militia factions may be realisable. Indeed, in several areas agreements 
have resulted in the collection of heavy weaponry, which have been cantoned not 
burnt. As one international official trying to plan for assistance in this area put it: 
Rehabilitation, Demobilisation and Disarmament (RDD) in that order make more 
sense than DDR – a phrase echoed by at least one other official on the ground. 
Moreover, there is a general lack of trust in any authorities, and people will be wary 
of any new government, especially one made up of warlords. This leads some to argue 
that “the new government cannot be given a monopoly of force on day one.” 
 
Also central to the issue of disarmament is the perception of the problem. The SNRC 
Committee, a third of whose members were self-proclaimed ‘colonels’, sees the 
crucial issue as one of “removing weapons from the hands of the civilians … people 
who are not trained nor qualified to handle them, and are thus destroying their 
country, their people and their property”. The report (CRD, 2004) of a Mogadishu-
based think-tank reminds us that the SNRC is made up very largely of those people 
who have been responsible for the last 15 years of armed violence. Another 
experienced interviewee from the War-torn Societies Project asserted that “insecurity 
is not due to the diffusion of weapons to the general public, but to those involved in 
the continuing organised violent incidents, like road-blocks, the various militias, who 
number only a few thousand”. 
 
The intractable nature of this most difficult of the Armed Violence Reduction agenda 
was acknowledged in the WSP Report on ‘Issues and Possibilities for Puntland’ 
(WSP, 2001). In a document replete with creative and practical recommendations for 
the road ahead in all other respects, there was an admission of “the workshop 
participants’ inability to make any meaningful proposals” to a situation in Puntland, 
“teeming with weapons”. There was also a recognition that no government could 
claim to have re-established the rule of law without a workable solution. In a 
determinedly self-reliant planning document, this was one area where stakeholders 
admitted the need for technical support from outside. However, Somaliland did 
undertake a process of demobilisation of fighters in 1993, which was largely 
successful, and at that stage and later conducted disarmament operations. There lies a 
potential useful learning experience. However, whether it will be taken on board may 
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be affected by the potentially tense relationship between the new authorities in 
Mogadishu and those in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. 
 
As the comment above about prioritising stability and alternative livelihoods 
underlines, issues to do with disarmament, its timing and its methods have to be 
considered alongside planning of humanitarian intervention and in the provision of 
development. This latter dimension will be especially crucial in programming DDR 
and other programmes during the transitional period hopefully now ahead. 
 
7.2 To what extent should the programming of development and 
humanitarian aid take armed violence into account and how?  
 
At the root of the spectacular failure of humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the 
early 1990s, and one root of present disorders and dilemmas about delivering aid, was 
the policy of making food aid deliveries a stratagem for undermining the patronage of 
warlords who controlled deliveries of food. The lessons of a miscalculation of 
integrating humanitarian relief and peace enforcement have not yet been fully applied, 
or have been forgotten by new donor generations. Realisation of the pitfalls to be 
avoided in integrating peace-making with relief and development does not, however, 
justify rejection of a more integrated approach. 
 
Other lessons from other arenas do not appear to have been applied in Somalia. 
Montani & Majid (2002) in an insightful evaluation of a range of humanitarian 
interventions suggest that the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and its member 
organisations have not given due emphasis to that part of its aims that calls for longer-
term efforts to promote sustainable livelihoods. They also feel that donors and NGOs 
do not sufficiently take the political economy of violence into account by citing the 
infrequency of any of them consulting the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). 
They also point to a tendency to respond to the special hazard of working in the 
challenging context in Somalia by sticking to ‘safe’ programming, tried and tested, 
rather than being innovative. 
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Annex 1. Somalia: current nutrition situation4
                                                 
4 Reproduced by kind permission from the Food Security Analysis Unit of the UN FAO. 
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